Legal Decisions Requiring Family Court Judges to comply with Statuary Law to charge the state for the AFC cost and not charge parents.
It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used.
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 359 N.E.2d 1338 (1976)
“The one area, above all, where a court should exercise caution is when it is deciding its own power” (State ex rel. Affiliated Constr. Trades Foundation v. Vieweg, 205 W.Va. 687, 694, 520 S.E.2d 854, 861  ).
Bank of New York Mellon v Izmirligil, 43 Misc 3d 409, 424 [Sup Ct 2014]
As stated in McKinney’s Statutes, § 73: a statute must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all of the problems and complications which might arise in the course of its administration; and no matter what disastrous consequences may result from following the expressed intent of the Legislature, the Judiciary cannot avoid its duty. See also, Bender v. Jamaica Hospital, 40 N.Y.2d 560, 561, 388 N.Y.S.2d 269, 356 N.E.2d 1228 (1976) (“Where the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, the legislation must be interpreted as it exists.”) and Matter of the Transfer Tax upon the Estate of Catharine A. *486 De Peyster, 210 N.Y. 216, 225, 104 N.E. 714 (1914) (“When an act of the legislature is expressed in clear language, it is the duty of the courts to enforce such act in accordance with the letter of the statute.”)
In re Gabriel A., 5 Misc.3d 479 Family Court, Queens County, New York. (2004)
Two staunch and relevant principles of statutory construction guide this court to this conclusion. The first of such principles is that “a court cannot amend a statute by inserting words that are not there, nor will a court read into a statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to enact” (Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v. Jorling, 85 N.Y.2d 382, 394, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1, 649 N.E.2d 1145 , citing McKinney’s Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 363, at 525; see Gural v. Drasner, 114 A.D.3d 25, 977 N.Y.S.2d 218 [1st Dept. 2013] ). The second is that an “inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted and excluded” (Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v. Jorling, 85 N.Y.2d 382, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1, 649 N.E.2d 1145, id., quoting Statutes § 240, at 412; see Gural v. Drasner, supra ).
Bank of New York Mellon v Izmirligil, 43 Misc 3d 409, 421 [Sup Ct 2014]
The power of courts of statutory origin will be strictly limited to the exact literal meaning of the words used in the statute, holding them to the precise limits of jurisdiction prescribed by law. See People v. Henries, 136 Misc. 224, 227, 241 N.Y.S. 127.
Reichhold Chemicals v Schenectady Coating Corp., 173 Misc 395, 396 [NY Co Ct 1940] revd, 260 AD 830 [3d Dept 1940]
The City Court of Rochester is a court of limited jurisdiction. It has only such jurisdiction and powers as have been ‘expressly’ conferred upon it by the Legislature of the State of New York, by whose action the court was created. Laws 1907, c. 755, § 466 et seq., as added by Laws 1918, c. 495, § 10. People v. Kraft, 229 App.Div. 281, 242 N.Y.S. 348; People ex rel. Folk v. Mc Nulty, 256 App.Div. 82, 9 N.Y.S.2d 380; People v. Mittleman, 150 Misc. 394, 268 N.Y.S. 819; People v. Henries, 136 Misc. 224, 241 N.Y.S. 127; People v. Berberrich, 20 Barb. 224; Rohssler v. Rohssler, 120 Misc. 569, 199 N.Y.S. 830.
Without Section 110, Section 37–a of the General Construction Law might apply, but certainly, giving full force and effect to, and applying, Section 110 of the General Construction Law, we do not see how any such a construction as the plaintiff contends for can be given in this situation. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the rule, to which we referred at the outset, that a court of limited jurisdiction has only such powers as are ‘expressly conferred’, and as stated by Judge Knapp in People v. Henries (supra) ‘the powers of courts of statutory origin will be strictly limited to the exact literal meaning of the words used in the statute, holding them to the precise limits of jurisdiction prescribed by law’.
Thomas v McFarlin, 172 Misc 1000, 1003 [NY Co Ct 1940]
This instant proceeding was originated in the Family Court, constitutionally a Court of limited jurisdiction. N.Y.Const., art. VI, Sec. 13; Adams v. Rhoades, 56 Misc.2d 249, 288 N.Y.S.2d 710; Burns v. Burns, 53 Misc.2d 484, 278 N.Y.S.2d 669. A Court of limited jurisdiction may only exercise that authority expressly granted to it.
Larney v Brown, 70 Misc 2d 546, 548-49 [Fam Ct 1972]
This rule constitutes a corollary to the principle that a court of limited jurisdiction possesses only those powers endowed by statute; hence the record must show proof of all the conditions which the statute declares to be essential (Buffalo Savings Bank v. Tuott, 236 App.Div. 556, 558, 260 N.Y.S. 249, 251).
Smith v Weitz, 14 Misc 2d 519, 521 [NY Co Ct 1958]
The Family Court, as a Court of limited jurisdiction, is confined in its actions to the powers granted to it by the precise language of the statute which creates it. Article 4 of the Family Court Act (L.1962 Ch. 686 eff. Sept. 1, 1962)
Graham v Graham, 43 Misc 2d 89, 90 [Sup Ct 1964]
The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction in New York with its jurisdiction specifically defined by statute and the Constitution of the State of New York. See Burns v. Burns, 53 Misc.2d 484, 278 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1967); see also, Graham v. Graham, 43 Misc.2d 89, 249 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1964).
C.O’C v M.M., 26 Misc 3d 328, 329 [Fam Ct 2009]
The fact that all the parties are before the court does not, as plaintiff suggests, give the court the right to adjudicate all issues between them. That some courts may do so does not mean that a court of limited powers may.
Kwoczka v Dry Dock Sav. Bank, 52 Misc 2d 67, 71 [Civ Ct 1966]
A Court of law, however, must not be a Court of sentiment, whether or not a small claim is involved. The N.Y. City Civil Court Act, Article 18, which governs “Small Claims” requires that cases be decided according to the substantive law
Dunlay v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 137 Misc 2d 1048, 1049 [NY City Ct 1988]
Local, inferior courts have only such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred by statute. Article VI, Sec. 18, State Constitution.
Slutzky v Lehman, 32 NYS2d 549, 550 [NY Co Ct 1941]
“The doctrine that courts have an inherent jurisdiction to mould the proceedings to meet new conditions and exigencies, is true, but in a limited sense. They cannot, under cover of procedure or to accomplish justice in a particular case, invade recognized rights of person or property” (id., at 55, 29 N.E. 235).
Thus, a court may not significantly affect the legal relationship between litigating parties through the exercise of its rule-making authority (see, Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 104, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 160 N.E.2d 43). Furthermore, no court rule can enlarge or abridge rights conferred by statute (see, Broome County Farmers’ Fire Relief Assn. v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 239 App.Div. 304, 306, 268 N.Y.S. 131; affd. 264 N.Y. 614, 191 N.E. 591), and this bars the imposition of additional procedural hurdles that impair statutory remedies (see, Chase Watch Corp. v. Heins, 284 N.Y. 129, 29 N.E.2d 646; cf., Matter of Brusco v. Braun, 84 N.Y.2d 674, 682, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291, 645 N.E.2d 724).
People v Ramos, 85 NY2d 678, 687-88 
While some matters are not subject to the constitutionally conferred power of the legislature to regulate practice and procedure in the courts because such matters touch upon the inherent nature of the judicial function, rather than the regulation of practice and procedure, any such inherent power of the courts is not unlimited; the courts simply cannot, under cover of procedure or to accomplish justice in a particular case, invade recognized rights of person and property. McKinney’s Const. Art. 6, § 30;McKinney’s Judiciary Law §§ 211, 212(2)(d); 22 NYCRR 80.1.
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit. February 21, 1961 288 F.2d 579
Headnote: Statutory courts have no jurisdiction except as conferred by statute.
Jurisdiction of statutory courts requires basis in clear legislative pronouncements.
Legislature must expand or remove legislative limitations on statutory courts.
- S. ex rel. Rudick v. Laird
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit. April 23, 1969 412 F.2d 16
Headnote: “Jurisdiction” is authority to hear and determine a cause; it is, in essence, power to adjudicate action; if court lacks jurisdiction over action, it lacks power to act with respect thereto.
Associated Industries of New York State v. Ickes
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. February 8, 1943 134 F.2d 694
Headnote: A lack of constitutional power in a court to hear a case constitutes want of “jurisdiction”. U.S.C.A. Const. art. 3, § 2.
People v. De Renna
County Court, Bronx County, New York. March 3, 1938 166 Misc. 582
Headnote: A court cannot create jurisdiction for itself, but jurisdiction must be conferred by law, and the mode pointed out whereby it may be acquired must be substantially complied with.
People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of Kings County
Supreme Court, New York County, New York, Special Term. September 1, 1937 164 Misc. 355
Headnote: Jurisdiction is not conferred merely by judicial or other assertions, but must have basis in law and in fact, and inquiry into question of jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceeding is not precluded by mere recital of its existence. Jurisdiction is not conferred merely by judicial or other assertions, but must have basis in law and in fact.